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abstract:  This article argues that Oakeshott’s theory of freedom possesses a
greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott’s
philosophy may be defined as ‘recognized contingency’, combining the notions of a
genuine choice of action and of an agent’s awareness of having such a choice.
Oakeshott employs his notion of freedom in two different contexts. One is the
context in which freedom is understood as a concept distinguishing what is conceived
as ‘human’ from what is conceived as ‘non-human’. The other context is that of
membership in societies, which under certain circumstances can be characterized
either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The article argues that, while at first
glance Oakeshott’s ideas look counter-intuitive, at a deeper level this understanding of
freedom is akin to that prevalent in the consciousness of modern liberal societies.
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Introduction
It is widely recognized that the idea of freedom lies at the heart of Michael
Oakeshott’s social thought. According to Noel O’Sullivan, the main feature of
Oakeshott’s temperament was ‘a love of freedom so radical and uncompromising
that it imbued his conservatism with existentialist, and even anarchist, sympa-
thies’.1 In On Human Conduct freedom occupies the central place. It is described
by Oakeshott as a postulate of human conduct in general, and as an underlying
principle of the civil association. Yet the idea of freedom in Oakeshott’s philo-
sophy has not received due attention from commentators, at least in comparison
with other much discussed themes such as rationalism, ideology and tradition.
This can be partly explained by the fact that, although the value of freedom is
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he means by freedom is brief and dense, and perhaps incomplete. Various inter-
preters find it difficult to present a detailed and coherent analysis of a concept
described in a few paragraphs.
The most scrupulous analysis of Oakeshott’s theory of freedom in his late 
writings has been undertaken by John Liddington, according to whom Oakeshott
uses the word ‘freedom’ in three different meanings: freedom of human agency,
political freedom and substantive freedom.2 Liddington finds all three meanings
partly confused, contradictory and unconvincing. Although Liddington’s inter-
pretation has been challenged at some points, his article still remains the most
important and comprehensive treatment of the subject, since it provides us with
the fullest account of Oakeshott’s position.3
In this article I have undertaken to present Oakeshott’s theory of freedom in a
different light. Taking Liddington’s argument as the starting point, I try to show
that his interpretation of Oakeshott’s position is misleading. I argue that
Oakeshott held a coherent, simple and rather elegant view of freedom. Unfor-
tunately, Oakeshott is partly to blame himself for the misinterpretations, for he
never articulated the idea of freedom in a clear way and did not publish any
response to criticisms of his position. Therefore, my account is merely the 
interpretation of what I take Oakeshott’s underlying view to be, but this is not an
arbitrary interpretation. I intend to show that, if Oakeshott’s ideas are to be taken
seriously, this is the most plausible interpretation which is implied in the text
itself.
The view that I want to present is as follows. For Oakeshott, the term ‘free-
dom’ always refers to the same concept consisting of two mutually dependent
characteristics – ‘reflectivity’ and ‘contingency’. However, Oakeshott uses the
concept of freedom in two different contexts. One is the context in which free-
dom is employed as a concept distinguishing what is understood as ‘human’ from
what is understood as ‘non-human’. The other is that of human beings, under-
stood as members of societies, which under certain circumstances can be charac-
terized either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The application of the idea
of ‘recognized contingency’ makes a specific meaning of ‘freedom’ different in
those two contexts. I will refer to ‘recognized contingency’ in the first context as
‘human freedom’, and in the second context as ‘civil freedom’.
This interpretation of Oakeshott’s idea of freedom will lead us to two impor-
tant conclusions. First, although Oakeshott repudiates the extreme utilitarian
concept of freedom, according to which freedom is correlative of the amount of
physical and legal restrictions on human actions, his views correspond to the
basic intuitions of the modern western liberal consciousness and lie within the
philosophical tradition akin to what is known as ‘negative liberty’. Second, Oake-
shott’s position is extremely helpful in providing answers to some difficulties
often discussed in recent debates on the meaning of freedom.
European Journal of Political Theory 2(1)
58
EPT 2/1 articles  21/11/02  11:10 am  Page 58
Human Freedom
According to Oakeshott’s view outlined in On Human Conduct, freedom is intrin-
sic to human conduct as such, for it is postulated in our understanding of human
agency. A postulate in Oakeshott’s terminology means an unquestioned pre-
supposition on which any judgment or investigation of a particular identity is
based. Thus, reality is a series of experienced events, or ‘goings-on’. In order to
become intelligible such ‘goings-on’ must be identified by being understood in
terms of ideal characters specified as a composition of characteristics. Every such
understanding is based upon an uncriticized assumption. Such assumptions 
cannot be questioned in the process of identifying ‘goings-on’, for they constitute
a ‘platform’ of investigation.
To investigate this platform, that is the postulates on which a certain ideal
character is based, is a different undertaking. A confusion between the investiga-
tion of postulates and the investigation of a particular situation analysed under
these postulates should be avoided. A postulate does not presuppose any particu-
lar outcome:
To read the face of Big Ben (that is, to ‘tell the time’) postulates and therefore does not
interrogate the idea ‘time’; ‘time’ here is unproblematic; the problem is, ‘What is the
time?’ And to understand a ‘going-on’ such as ‘my friend Tom considering which of two
hats he shall buy’ postulates and therefore does not interrogate the ideas ‘deliberation’ and
‘choice’.4
Therefore, when Oakeshott says that human conduct postulates a ‘free agent’,5
he means that human actions cannot be understood without the presupposition
that freedom is somehow intrinsic to them. Freedom is not something that may
be present or absent, may be more or less. Human conduct can be understood
only as a free conduct, and therefore freedom, thus understood, cannot deter-
mine any particular performance of action. In other words, every act of every
human agent is a free act. How is this possible and what conclusions can be
derived from this assumption?
Oakeshott distinguishes between two categories of identities, each of them
inviting a different order of inquiry. The first category includes ‘goings-on’
which are not themselves exhibitions of intelligence, like rock formations or a
chameleon changing colour. To understand them means to grasp conditions
which somehow determine what is occurring, but the operation of which does
not require our understanding or learning them. These conditions are not an 
acting intelligence and are therefore devoid of any meaning apart from the fact
of their having happened. Here the relationship between the conditioned and
conditional is understood as a causally determined process.
The other category includes ‘goings-on’ which are themselves exhibitions of
intelligence, like the engagement of understanding. They are understood in
terms of what Oakeshott calls practice, which can be described as ‘the ordered
context from which the performance draws its meaning’.6 In other words, prac-
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tice does not determine a specific content of any act, but creates a cultural con-
text which gives the meaning to a particular action. Thus, the procedure of elec-
tion does not cause a participant to vote for a specific candidate, but enables us
to understand the meaning of his act of voting (or not voting). Evoking the
hermeneutic approach, Oakeshott insists that it is impossible to give an account
of an intelligent action without learning its meaning for the agent himself.
These two categories are exclusive of one another. The ‘goings-on’ understood
as a process cannot be understood as a practice and vice versa, since practice only
creates the meaningful context of action, while process determines its content.
This does not mean that a certain ‘going-on’ has got a predisposed character
which defines it as either intelligible or non-intelligible. Indeed any event can be
treated in both ways. Thus, human behaviour can be understood either as an
effect of biochemical process, or a meaningfully chosen act. What should be
avoided is the confusion of what order of inquiry is undertaken.
Oakeshott understands human conduct as a category of inquiry which is itself
an exhibition of intelligence. Any attempt to combine this inquiry with the view
of human conduct as a result of ‘process’ is therefore excluded by definition.
Human conduct is understood as an intelligent identity, and freedom is a postu-
late of such conduct. Therefore, freedom is inherent in our understanding of
human nature. But what does Oakeshott mean by this word?
I suggest that freedom can be identified as ‘recognized contingency’. It con-
tains two interdependent aspects – reflectivity and contingency. In order to show
how it can be plausibly argued that freedom is presupposed in human conduct, I
will analyse these two aspects separately, but it is important to realize that they,
in fact, represent an unseparate whole.
Reflectivity 
Human conduct is the exhibition of intelligence. The human world is a world of
understanding and meaning. The intelligibility of a situation is what makes an
agent ‘free’. The human agent is ‘reflective consciousness’, and freedom is pre-
supposed by his self-understanding and not by free will. As Oakeshott points out,
an agent ‘is “free” not because his situation is alterable by an act of unconstrained
“will” but because it is an understood situation and because doing is an intelligent
engagement’.7
This world of meanings must be learned, and learning is inseparable from
being human.8 Understanding can be achieved only in an individual way, for 
. . . if two or more agents have similar understandings of their situation this is because they
have independently learned to think alike and not because they share common organic
tensions, have similar genetic characters, or have suffered or enjoyed like external
circumstances.9
Any situation is always an agent’s own situation.
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The idea of freedom presented in such a way is reminiscent of either the Stoic
concept of freedom, or of the Hegelian view of will as derivative from thought.10
It seems to stand far away from the empiricist view of freedom characteristic of
English philosophy. This leads such commentators as Robert Devigne to place
Oakeshott among those who spurn the idea of negative liberty.11
Indeed, in various places Oakeshott evokes a quasi-Hegelian vocabulary, 
saying, for example, that ‘a human being is “free”, not because he has “free will”,
but because he is in himself what he is for himself’.12 But whatever this Hegelian
phraseology may mean, Oakeshott’s view must be sharply distinguished from 
the Hegelian view in particular and the post-Kantian German philosophies of
freedom in general.
First, Oakeshott explicitly states that he is not preoccupied with various meta-
physical or teleological meanings of freedom, pointing out that he is concerned
‘not with the quality of being substantively “self-directed” which an agent may or
may not achieve and which, when a high degree of it is enjoyed, is properly called
“self-determination” or “autonomy”’.13
Second, although freedom always involves ‘thought’ it does not involve merely
thought, for thought relates to doing, and doing is always understood through
the contingency of a specific situation.
Contingency 
Far from advocating ‘rationality’ of thought Oakeshott puts emphasis on intelli-
gence in order to highlight the significance of choice and deliberation in a human
action. Freedom for him does not mean awareness per se, but the awareness of a
situation. This situation, so long as it is seen as one’s own situation, always
demands a response from the agent. This response cannot be determined and it
always necessitates the choice to do this rather than that. The quality of choice is
unimportant here, for the decision to do something may be stupid as well as
clever. The important feature of it is the necessity of choice itself.
Oakeshott calls this situation ‘contingent’. For him a contingent relationship is 
. . . a sequential relationship of intelligent individual occurrences where what comes after 
is recognized to be conditional upon what went before . . . because they ‘touch’ and in
touching identify themselves as belonging together and as composing an intelligible
continuity of conditionally dependent occurrences.14
In other words, contingency for Oakeshott is not a relationship by accident.15 It
is rather such connection between two events in which the consequent event
acquires meaning in the context of the antecedent event, but is not determined
by it. Contingency presupposes indeterminacy.16
Now, one can see that although we have distinguished between reflectivity and
contingency, they presuppose and depend on each other, for ‘in an agent’s under-
standing of his situation its contingency is postulated’.17 This means that a con-
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scious agent must find his situation as one in which he is supposed to make an
indeterminate performance. Likewise, if one is speaking about a situation the
outcome of which is not determinate, he presupposes the involvement of an intel-
ligent actor.
Thus, Oakeshott’s view of human freedom seems to refer to the philosophical
tradition which emphasizes inner ‘thought’ rather than external constraint in its
definition of freedom. Yet it incorporates basic modern intuitions about freedom
as a freedom of choice. Indeed, Oakeshott’s approach makes the distinction
between free will, free choice and free action obsolete. There is no separate 
faculty such as free will, existing even if there is no freedom of action. Every
human action is a free action, and it is free because it is never the only possible
action. There is always an awareness of the presence of choice to do this or that.
Every action is always seen as a result of free choice. But does such combination
of reflectivity and action look plausible?
One can argue that there are some situations in which freedom of choice is
absent or is severely limited. In this case, one should either claim that an agent is
unfree, or redefine freedom in a purely inner way to avoid dealing with conduct.
But this is not Oakeshott’s position since he maintains that all human agents are
free, and also that choice is an important aspect of freedom.
The response may be as follows. In so far as one understands himself as a
human agent, he will not see his situation as devoid of any choice. Even the con-
duct of a prisoner is indeterminate so that he may choose to perform what he is
allowed or is required to do in different ways. A slave can decide either to obey
or to disobey and be killed, but this is his own decision.
Oakeshott, however, does not mean that slaves and prisoners are socially free,
and this is why it is necessary to distinguish between two contexts of the use of
the term ‘freedom’. In the context of social relations, freedom is understood dif-
ferently. But in so far as one wants to understand what it means to be a human
agent, in comparison with a broom, it is quite plausible to come to the conclu-
sion that the two are distinguished by the fact that a human being is free, while a
broom is not. Thus, when a slave compares himself with free citizens, he thinks
about himself as socially unfree. But if he asks himself whether there is any dif-
ference between him and the broom of his master, since both are subject to the
master and do the same work, his answer perhaps will be that the broom is unfree
to choose to disobey. In this context it will be perfectly legitimate to use the term
‘freedom’ in such a sense. Moreover, even one’s thoughts can be understood as
acts, so that one who is tied by chains finds himself in the situation of indeter-
minacy, as long as he can make a choice of what to think.
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Civil Freedom
In the context of a social relationship, however, Oakeshott does not discuss in
what sense a human being as such can be seen as free compared with non-human
beings, but rather, in what sense a member of a society can be free or not with
regard to a different kind of society.18
Oakeshott distinguishes between two kinds of durable social relationships in
which human agents can be engaged – enterprise association and civil association.
The enterprise association is one in which members are united in order to
achieve some common substantive purpose. This purpose may be clear or 
vague, simple or complex. However, the existence of such purpose is the main
characteristic of this kind of association. This is a relationship in terms of 
‘management’, since the members must have an acknowledged way of making
circumstantial decisions to do this rather than that in order to respond to a situa-
tion and to achieve a result. The association may have rules, but the reason for
the existence of these rules is prudential. It is whether and how well they promote
the pursuit of the common purpose.19
The other kind is called by Oakeshott ‘civil association’. The members of the
civil association, by contrast, are related not in terms of common purpose but in
terms of moral practice. What characterizes such an association is a subscription
to common, general and articulated rules, which are called lex. The word lex does
not signify every law but only the law which is formulated in terms of subscrip-
tion to general practice and which does not require substantive performances.
Lex does not prescribe what one must do but rather sets conditional rules to
which substantive performances must be subscribed.20
The membership in both kinds of associations may be voluntary or compul-
sory. If it is voluntary, so that a member may leave his association at any time,
such a member is certainly free, and no theoretical problem arises. Therefore,
freedom in a voluntary enterprise association exists, for its members can volun-
tarily choose to cancel their membership.21
A really important question is whether freedom may exist in an association in
which the membership is compulsory. Oakeshott gives different answers with
respect to the two modes of association. He insists that the members of the com-
pulsory enterprise association are unfree, while the members of the compulsory
civil association are free. The importance of this question lies in the fact that the
modern state is, undoubtedly, a compulsory association. Even if one is allowed to
leave his state he is likely to find himself in another state. Therefore, according
to Oakeshott, citizens of any state could be considered free only to the extent that
their state is seen as a civil association.
Why do citizens remain free in a compulsory civil association? The answer 
lies in the character of its law. Lex, as a system of general rules, does not com-
mand substantive performances but merely imposes certain conditions on our
choices:
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The appearance procedures and rules may have of excluding (forbidding), or more rarely
of enjoining, substantive choices and actions is illusive. Practices identify actions
adverbially; they exclude (forbid) or enjoin them in terms of prescribed conditions. A
criminal law, which may be thought to come nearest to forbidding actions, does not forbid
killing or lighting a fire, it forbids killing ‘murderously’ or lighting a fire ‘arsonically’; and
these adverbs are narrowly specified in terms of the evidence required to substantiate or to
rebut the considerations alleged.22
Rules do not prescribe a substantive performance, and subscription to them does
not remove from an agent the possibility of recognizing himself in a contingent
situation in which he is able to make a choice to do this rather than that, and thus
remain free. No realm can escape the authority of law. As John Coats interprets
it, ‘for Oakeshott, the freedom of citizens arises not in the silence but in the 
generality of the laws’.23 Freedom is dependent on the adverbial character of law
in the civil condition. Thus, Oakeshott opens the way to the reconciliation
between law and freedom.
The idea of the indeterminacy of human conduct in the civil association (the
freedom to chose this rather than that) is stressed by Oakeshott several times,
which lets Liddington claim that this view of freedom (which he calls ‘substan-
tive’ freedom) lies at the heart of Oakeshott’s view.24 But it is easy to see that the
principle of adverbiality does not provide us with any criterion of distinction
between the civil and enterprise association. For, according to Oakeshott, no
system of rules can determine substantive performances, because any maxim 
formulated on any level of generality will leave room for variations when applied
to practice.25 Oakeshott himself admits that general rules exist in the enterprise
association as well. If this is the case, then the members of the enterprise associ-
ation are not less free than the members of the civil association. One can 
imagine such an association in which the purpose is pursued only by means of
general rules and not specific commands.
Further, the idea of the adverbial character of lex seems to be counter-intuitive
and contradictory in itself, so that it invites almost indefensible attacks, particu-
larly from the utilitarian liberal view. Thus, Liddington, while agreeing that
there are many laws which seem to be formal, such as contract laws, puts the
question of whether every law can be formal:
If a law prohibiting murder can be a procedural law, what would not count as a procedural
law? If a law prohibiting fire-raising may be said to qualify rather than determine the
performance of fire-lighting, why may not a law prohibiting (say) ‘bourgeois’ education be
said to qualify rather than determine the performance of learning and teaching. And if, as
Oakeshott’s view would seem to imply, a law prohibiting larceny does not necessarily
restrict substantive freedom, why should we suppose that a law prohibiting private
property necessarily restricts it?26
This is indeed a very strong criticism. Moreover, the problem remains even when
one considers laws which are enacted in order to promote basic freedoms, such
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as a law which regulates the freedom of demonstration. For, although the essence
of this law may be providing the most favourable conditions for all groups to
demonstrate peacefully, still it must restrict some substantive actions in order to
create the conditions of peace and security. It is difficult to see at first glance how
these laws do not restrict freedom at all.
What can be said as a possible defence against this criticism? The first claim
may be prudential, like that of Hayek, that the rule by general laws is not likely
to lead to the violation of freedom, since those who enact such laws will also have
to comply with them.27 Whatever the plausibility of such a claim may be, it does
not refute the criticisms against Oakeshott, since Oakeshott himself rejects any
prudential considerations in his discussion.
Second, one can argue that not only should laws be formulated in an adverbial
way, but they must be non-substantive in their content. According to Coats, ‘if a
putative practice of authority included stipulations sufficiently specific as to be
unambiguously performable in single actions, it would expose itself . . . as an
“instrumental” practice only masquerading as a “civil” practice’.28
But in order to know which laws are really ‘civil’ and which ones only pretend
to be ‘civil’, one needs an external criterion of what is counted as ‘unambiguously
specific’. Thus, the criterion of adverbiality cannot stand on its own feet and
serve as an ultimate guide for what is regarded as lex. But it is even dubious
whether an objective criterion for what is ‘unambiguously specific’ can be found
at all. Consider the example of the demonstration law. Such law may have two
different purposes. In a free democratic state its main purpose is to ensure the
peaceful and orderly character of any demonstration and also to provide a guar-
antee for as many groups as possible to use this right. Thus, the law may require
the registration with police, whose function is not to limit the expression of 
different ideas but to prevent the outbreak of violent disturbances. On the other
hand, in a dictatorship the demonstration law may be used in order to forbid the
expression of some views and ideas. As both laws may sound identical, one should
look not only at their texts but also at their actual implementation in order to
know what their character is.
Third, one can say that Oakeshott’s claim that formal laws are fully compatible
with freedom is simply a rhetorical exaggeration, and that he perhaps wants to say
that freedom is almost not constrained by such laws, or that it is not constrained
significantly. But this interpretation would just mean that one refuses to take
Oakeshott’s argument seriously. For, whatever obscurities can be found in
Oakeshott’s text, it is absolutely plain that he thinks that formal laws do not limit
freedom at all.
Thus, all these attempts to compromise the meaning of Oakeshott’s argument
are inadequate. The concept of ‘substantive’ freedom seems neither to be correct
in itself, nor to provide and maintain a valid distinction between the two kinds of
association.
Yet another meaning of freedom is sometimes derived from Oakeshott’s 
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writings. This is what Liddington calls ‘political’ freedom, and what is regarded
as the essential element of Oakeshott’s view by many other interpreters.29
Sometimes Oakeshott argues that freedom in the civil association is derivative
from the non-purposive character of such an association. As no purpose exists, no
need arises to demand citizens’ approval of the purpose of their alleged enter-
prise. The authority of lex is sovereign and self-sufficient. The authority of rules
is separated from their approval. The rules do not need to be approved in order
to be subscribed, and disapproval cannot be a reason for disobedience. Lex
cannot include the requirement of belief. As Oakeshott says, ‘the reason for 
this veto is the impossibility of such a requirement being authoritative, not the
impossibility of its enforcement’.30 To claim the opposite would mean that there
is some link between acknowledgement and approval, and this would be a self-
contradiction, since the very authority of lex is implied in the fact that it cannot
be subject to any considerations of desirability and approval. The member of a
compulsory enterprise association cannot be free, since he is obliged to recognize
the purpose of his association, whereas the members of the civil association ‘are
related solely in virtue of their acknowledgment of the authority, not the desir-
ability, of . . . prescribed conditions . . . There is, then, nothing in civil associa-
tion to threaten the link between belief and conduct which constitutes “free”
agency . . .’.31
This idea is treated more favourably by many commentators, perhaps because
of its overtones of the classical views of participatory democracy and the possi-
bility of dissent which it provides. It also seems to provide a better answer as to
why freedom exists only in the compulsory civil association, for its purposeless
character avoids any need of approval of a purpose. Liddington argues that
Oakeshott overlooks the possibility of the existence of several purposes at the
same association, but I do not think that this criticism holds. These several pur-
poses are either compatible or not. If they are compatible, then the general unit-
ing purpose can be derived from them. If they are not, then some other principle
is needed in order to reconcile the conflict between them, such as an idea of 
the association as a system of not-purposive rules enabling the coexistence of
conflicting purposes.
Yet this interpretation of the meaning of freedom is not any more satisfactory
than the concept of ‘substantive’ freedom, mainly because it contradicts the most
important of Oakeshott’s ideas. First, in the distinction between civil and enter-
prise association, the emphasis is certainly put on the indeterminacy of choice in
subscribing to rules and not on the idea of dissent. Commentators deal with the
idea of adverbiality not because they fail to acknowledge that it does not provide
a good criterion (as Anthony Farr perhaps implies32), but simply because of what
is said in the text. Oakeshott’s idea that the members of an enterprise association
are required to perform substantive acts and are denied the choice to do this
rather than that, is much more salient than the idea that they cannot express 
their disapproval of the common purpose.
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Second, the adoption of this interpretation implies conclusions that Oakeshott
would certainly reject. Thus, according to this view, prisoners in slave-labour
camps are unfree only if these camps are seen as an instrument in some project,
such as industrial development. But if these camps exist only as a feature of the
association without any purpose, the prisoners would be free, particularly if they
are allowed to express their disapproval of their condition. And then, indeed,
Steven Gerencser is right, insisting that, if freedom is understood as the right to
disapprove the purpose of an association, it should be also seen as the right to dis-
approve the terms of an association.33 But Oakeshott would hardly support this
interpretation. Moreover, in one of his earlier essays he explicitly says that some
other freedoms are more important than the freedom of speech.34
Civil Freedom: Restatement
Thus, two distinct meanings which Liddington attributes to Oakeshott’s theory
of freedom have been found implausible and open to serious objections. Can any
satisfactory answer be given to these objections? I think that such an answer exists
and that it is implied in the text of On Human Conduct without being explicitly
stated. In my view, most objections presented here originate in Liddington’s mis-
interpretation of Oakeshott’s view of civil freedom, due, partly, to a too scrupu-
lous analysis of the text. This misinterpretation is based on the distinction
between formal/substantive and moral/instrumental qualities of law. This dis-
tinction is not clearly stated in On Human Conduct, and it is made by Liddington
who sees it as necessarily implied in the text.
Substantive law is the law which specifies a substantive performance. Formal
law is the law which establishes a set of general rules that qualify but do not deter-
mine agent’s actions. Laws can be also distinguished by whether they are purpo-
sive or not. Thus, there may be laws enacted in order to promote some purpose
extraneous to them, and then they are called instrumental. The laws which have
no such purpose are called ‘moral’. These two distinctions are not connected.
Instrumental laws (that is, laws established to achieve some purpose) are not 
necessarily substantive, since they can prescribe only general rules which pro-
mote the achievement of such a purpose. And in my view, moral laws, perhaps,
can be substantive if the commands which they contain do not serve any purpose.
As I see it, when Liddington makes this distinction, he naturally comes to 
distinguish between two kinds of civil freedom. ‘Substantive’ freedom is con-
cerned with the formal/substantive dimension of law – freedom exists if the law
is formal, and does not exist if the law is substantive. ‘Political’ freedom seems to
correspond to the moral/instrumental dimension – freedom dependent on the
existence or the absence of the acknowledged common purpose. This analytical
distinction can be derived from Oakeshott’s argument; moreover his argument
seems to require it. Nevertheless, Oakeshott does not clearly formulate this dis-
tinction, and ties the existence of a common purpose to the requirement to 
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perform a substantive action. Thus, according to him, a member of an enterprise
association ‘is bound to common substantive action in pursuit of an agreed 
common purpose’.35
I claim that this opaqueness is not accidental. On many occasions the differ-
ence between formal/substantive and moral/instrumental dimensions is blurred
up to the point that Oakeshott contrasts the ‘substantive’ feature of laws in the
enterprise association with the ‘moral’ quality of laws in the civil association, and
seems to imply that the common purpose in an enterprise association somehow
makes citizens perform substantive actions. But we have already seen that the
question of the ‘substantive’ character of rules is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to
the character of an association. Again, it is possible to imagine such an associa-
tion which is managed only by general rules, though these rules are designed, and
are understood to have been designed, to achieve a certain purpose. Does this
mean, then, that Oakeshott’s argument suffers from inadvertence?
I think that the answer to this is very simple, if one gets rid of all these dis-
tinctions. I claim that no two different meanings of civil freedom (‘political’ and
‘substantive’) exist. Indeed, Liddington himself finds that in most of the cases
Oakeshott mentions these two freedoms together, while calling them ‘civil free-
dom’.36 But he fails to draw the obvious conclusion from this fact, which is that
Oakeshott does not have in mind two different meanings of freedom. He simply
has a twofold understanding of the same civil freedom, when ‘political’ and ‘sub-
stantive’ are none other than the description of the same concept from different
points of view. Indeed in the summarized definition of civil freedom two ele-
ments are linked together. Civil freedom is described as ‘the condition of being
associated solely in terms of the recognition of the authority . . . of the adverbial
conditions of conduct’.37 That is, what is recognized is not authority per se, but
the authority of conditions which are always adverbial. In other words, in the civil
association only such laws are recognized as authoritative that leave room for a
choice in performing an action.
Theoretically, formal/instrumental laws (that is, laws which do not specify per-
formances, but nevertheless promote a certain goal) are possible. But Oakeshott
is not concerned with them because he thinks that he can describe the dichotomy
between two kinds of association in such a way that substantive demands will 
presuppose a common purpose, while formal laws will mean the absence of such
a purpose.
The claim implied here is that no law possesses objective quality and that the
character of any law is determined by citizens’ perceptions. Whenever a certain
law is grasped as ‘substantive’ it will be understood as implying some purpose,
while when it is perceived as ‘formal’, it will be seen as lacking such a purpose.
Likewise, if an association is grasped as having some purpose, its laws will be 
perceived as containing substantive demands, whereas, when an association is
understood as civil, its laws will not be seen as limiting one’s freedom of choice.
It is important that Oakeshott’s idealism is taken seriously. The crucial point
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is that, for Oakeshott, social reality is a reality of meanings which exists only in
the ideas and experience of human beings, so that no objective ‘social reality’ can
exist. As Jeremy Rayner puts it, ‘since the human relationships are an expression
of the self-understanding of the agents so related, to grasp the character of an
association must necessarily entail understanding the beliefs of the associates’.38
If one realizes that for Oakeshott ‘freedom’ is not a material quality but an
abstract concept which cannot exist apart from the perceptions of human agents,
we can in principle agree that it may quite well be the case that the perception of
‘formality’ of laws is connected to their purposeless character.
In order to see why this view can be plausible, or at least coherent, let us take
an example. The case of traffic laws is frequently presented in debates on free-
dom, because they are a good example for those authors who appeal to readers’
intuitions against what they see as a liberal view of ‘negative’ liberty. Thus,
Charles Taylor claims that we do not perceive these laws as violating our free-
dom, and believes that this proves that we attribute more significance to some
desires and goals than to others. From this point he makes a further step arguing
that some desires can be seen as more ‘rational’ or more ‘authentic’ than others,
and in this sense it is reasonable to speak about ‘positive’ liberty.39
Now, if my analysis of Oakeshott’s view is correct, he would agree with the
view that traffic laws do not limit our freedom, but would certainly disagree with
the view that it has something to do with the rationality of our preferences. Laws
which limit movement on roads do not violate freedom, while laws which limit
the right to emigrate do so, not because some rational order of preferences exists,
but because these are perceptions of citizens themselves. It is plausible to say that
a citizen of the modern state will not see his freedom limited as a result of the
traffic laws. Therefore, we do often think that there can be laws which leave us
completely free. But we think so precisely because we grasp these laws as formal
and not substantive, as establishing rules and not demanding actions. Now, one
can also say that we do not think that traffic laws are substantive because we do
not see them as implying some common goal. On the other hand, we do not
ascribe to these laws any goal because we do not feel that they demand substan-
tive performances.
In order to make this point clearer, let us deal with the objection that this view
probably invites. It can be argued that, although ‘freedom’ may be not restricted
by laws, actions are restricted, and therefore civil freedom may not mean the
absence of constraint on actions. The answer to this is that, according to my
interpretation, no action is perceived as restricted. A member of a society who
recognizes the authority of lex sees himself as acting within its context and there-
fore does not regard any action beyond this legal context as a possible option. 
An analogy with language can clarify this claim. A user of a language in which a 
certain tense (like ‘future continuous’) does not exist is, in some sense, restricted
from being able to say something which can be expressed only by using that
tense. And yet it would be quite sensible to say that, within the context of that
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language, freedom of expression is unrestricted. Similarly, a car driver can choose
different destinations and different routes, and his actions are unrestricted by the
requirement that he should drive only on the left side, because he sees this
requirement as a given context within which he tries to achieve his goals.
Trespassing these requirements is never an option in so far as the conditions of
civility are recognized. Analogously, human actions can never be seen as re-
stricted by the physical impossibility of achieving some goal (like flying to the
sun), because it is a given condition of human beings. Now, according to this
interpretation, civil laws can be recognized in this manner only if they are not seen
as enacted in order to promote some goal. Laws should not be seen as constrain-
ing us in achieving our life goals or as designed to hinder our choices.
Here lies the link between Oakeshott’s advocacy of freedom and his emphasis
on tradition. For only acquaintance with the cultural tradition and values of a 
certain society can show which choices and which life goals are regarded as
important by the members of this society, and, therefore, which rules will be seen
as limiting their freedom. Let us imagine a society in which for one reason or
another the limitation on our movement in the streets is no longer seen as a set
of formal rules that qualify citizens’ performances, but as a mechanism invented
to promote a certain social ideal. It is quite possible that many people would 
suddenly see in these laws unjustifiable limitation on their free choices. To take
a more realistic example, one could analyse the change in the content and imple-
mentation of decency laws. Within a stricter, more Victorian morality these 
limitations could be reasonably grasped as merely qualifying rules, within which
citizens could make their free choices. As cultural values changed and society
became more tolerant, these laws had to undergo a change, since previous 
limitations might be seen as imposing substantive requirements. In other words,
to deprive law of its character as lex is to show that this law does not establish the
context in which people pursue their goals, but rather promotes some social goal
and therefore restricts civil freedom.
Thus, in order to discern the character of a law, one should turn to the par-
ticular cultural milieu within which this law is enacted and interpreted. It is clear
then why Oakeshott preferred the system of common law to the European codi-
fied law. Precedent law is more flexible and open to social changes. This claim by
itself is not new. But Oakeshott provides it with a strong theoretical justification,
emphasizing the link between the idea of freedom and certain features of the
legal system.
Thus, for Oakeshott, citizens in a civil association are free because they are not
constrained. They are not constrained because they do not think that laws limit
their choices. This is because in the context of their tradition they have some 
perceptions of their possible purposes. Laws are not regarded as limiting these
purposes and therefore prescribing substantial actions, but rather seen as creat-
ing the context in which individuals deliberate about their choices. This idea is
central to the argument of On Human Conduct, but it can also be found in earlier
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writings of Oakeshott. Thus, he argues that to think of rights and duties as 
‘limitation’ is ‘a relic of an old intellectual error’, for:
. . . it is an unfortunate way of thinking which is inherent in the simpler forms of a natural
law conception of society. The truth is, however, that we do not begin by being free; the
structure of our freedom is the rights and duties which, by long and painful human effort,
have been established in our society. Individuality is not natural; it is a great human
achievement. The conditions of individuality are not limitations; there is nothing to limit.
And the adjustment of those conditions are not interference (unless they are overhead
adjustments); they are the continuation of the achievement.40
Now, if this interpretation of civil freedom is at least coherent, even if not con-
vincing, one can see how it fits into the general framework of Oakeshott’s
thought. For this concept is nothing else than the idea of ‘recognized contin-
gency’ in the context of social relationships. The two elements – reflectivity and
contingency – correspond to what Liddington defined as ‘political’ freedom and
‘substantive’ freedom. On the one hand, civil freedom presupposes the presence
of choice to do this rather than that. On the other hand, it requires the awareness
of an intelligent being of him having such a choice, and this awareness exists 
only when the laws are grasped as non-purposive. Contingency then must be 
recognized contingency.
This interpretation of civil freedom, however, leaves the way open to objec-
tions on the ground of its supposed relativism. For if freedom is determined by
the non-purposive non-substantive character of law, if such character cannot be
ascribed to any law objectively but only with regard to subjects’ perceptions, and
if, finally, these perceptions are conditioned by a specific cultural tradition, then
how can one distinguish between free and unfree associations? Would it not
mean that people in England and people in China just have different under-
standings of what their aspirations are and therefore of what will in effect limit
these aspirations? Will the Chinese freedom be no less genuine, though a very
different freedom?
Two answers can be given to this objection. First, the very complaint that this
theory does not give a criterion according to which one can judge whether a 
certain society is free simply confirms Oakeshott’s much-repeated claim that no
political theory can serve as a guide for practical actions and evaluations. This is
not just a failure of his specific approach; a similar charge of ‘relativism’ can be
directed towards any theory which attempts to formulate its principles with at
least some element of generality. In this sense the utilitarian approach is no more
satisfactory. The utilitarian approach seems to provide us with a very good proof
that Britain is a more free country than socialist Albania, but as Taylor showed,
it can be also employed in order to present the opposite claim.41
Second, although there is no demonstrative a priori way to determine which
society is free, the presuppositions of Oakeshott’s theory can still be used, though
not applied, on the practical level.42 For it will be possible to say to what extent a
particular state is free if the perceptions of its members about the nature of its
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laws are known. Thus, if the citizens of the former Communist countries had
thought about their laws as having an ‘adverbial’ character, if they had seen in the
laws forbidding ‘bourgeois’ education a merely conditional requirement, one
would have had to accept that they were no less free than the citizens of western
liberal countries. But in fact they never believed in all these things. Although
many of them supported their regimes, they did so not because they thought 
they had freedom. Thus, they were unfree not because their countries’ laws 
were ‘objectively’ purposive, but because they themselves regarded these laws as
purposive. This sort of answer was suggested by Oakeshott when he discussed 
the policies of socialists in his earlier article. Criticizing the claims that socialist
policies meant the achievement of a more real freedom, he claimed:
A man who, before the Truck Act, was defrauded of his wages, knew himself to be, to that
extent, a slave. He might be well-fed, secure in his job and enjoying a rising standard of
living; nevertheless, he was not to be gulled into thinking that he was as free as he would
be if his wages were paid him in cash. The Truck Act set him free. It did not say to him,
‘The price of this freedom is a bit off the other end of your freedom’: it was a gratuitous
addition to his freedom made by a civilized society, and if it had not been this it would
have not been freedom at all. And this All is the truth that has been lost in confusion: if
you are required to pay with freedom for an offered freedom, you can be certain that what
you are offered is not freedom at all, but something else.43
Here Oakeshott is quite certain that a modern individual has clear perceptions
about freedom which prevent him from buying egalitarian ideologies packed as
‘freedom’.
Likewise, Oakeshott is at pains to demonstrate that modern liberal democratic
countries are free to a large extent, by showing that they are seen by many citi-
zens as societas, and not universitas. This is especially true of political philosophers.
According to Oakeshott, almost every modern political thinker, including
Hobbes, Hegel and Fichte, intimated, if not explicitly expressed, the view of 
the modern society as a civil association.44 If my interpretation of his theory is
correct, then it becomes clear why this is so important for him. To show that the
best minds of the modern western states understood these states as civil associa-
tions means to show that these states are free states.
Concluding Remarks
Oakeshott understands freedom as a practical abstraction which comes to denote
what I have described as a ‘recognized contingency’. By this term I mean the
awareness of one’s own situation as contingent. In such a situation a person is
aware of being himself an agent who can respond to a particular situation in dif-
ferent ways. His specific choice is not determined by his situation.
This concept of freedom can, however, be applied in different contexts, thus
acquiring different meanings. In one context, freedom can be used as a concept
distinguishing a ‘human’ from a ‘non-human’ being. Then it is to be understood
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as inherent in any human being. This is what I call ‘human freedom’. In another
context, freedom can refer to social relationships. In this context freedom is
understood as being enjoyed by members of a society who perceive themselves as
not being obliged to perform substantive actions. This is what I call ‘civil free-
dom’.
‘Human freedom’ and ‘civil freedom’ are both called ‘freedom’ because they
employ the same idea of ‘recognized contingency’. Yet, when applied in those
two contexts, the notion of ‘recognized contingency’ plays out differently. In the
context of the discussion of what is ‘human’ it comes to mean the absence of
determinacy, while in the context of social relationships it evokes the idea of the
absence of constraint.
There is therefore no direct connection between ‘human’ and ‘civil’ freedom.
Their relation is not that of identity. It is clear that ‘human freedom’ is applied
universally to all human beings, and no one can be deprived of it, while many
people can be deprived of ‘civil freedom’. Nor can these two meanings be
deduced from each other, refuted by each other, or shown to be contradictory.
The relationship between them is not of logical (in)consistency, but that of 
logical irrelevance. The statement that someone is a free agent cannot teach us
anything about his civil condition.
Confusion may arise, because in some places Oakeshott draws a parallel
between ‘human’ and ‘civil’ freedom, pointing out that those who value civil free-
dom want to cherish their free agency.45 But here the connection is not logical
but rather psychological. Thus, one who acknowledges oneself as a human being
possessing freedom understood as recognized contingency is likely to attempt to
apply this idea to his civil condition and thus demand ‘civil freedom’ in addition
to ‘human freedom’ already enjoyed by him. Yet this awareness does not create
any logical relation between the two meanings of freedom except that of analo-
gy. For even those who are unhappy about their being in the condition of ‘human
freedom’ are, nevertheless, free agents as well.
What conclusions can be drawn from our adoption of such a view of freedom?
One is that Oakeshott’s theory of freedom is closer to our common-sense per-
ception of freedom than one could suggest at first glance. Thus, although his
view on ‘human freedom’ has Stoic, Kantian and Hegelian overtones, there are
two important qualifications. First, by combining it with the freedom of choice,
Oakeshott moves closer to a typically empiricist view of freedom. Second, by
insisting that ‘freedom’ in this sense is a postulate of human conduct, he rules out
any application of it to our practical choices. No choice makes us less or more
free.
Nor is the description of civil freedom significantly different from the liberal
‘negative’ idea of freedom. That freedom is implied in the generality of law may
sound too closely resembling Rousseau’s ideas.46 Nevertheless, the two authors
are completely different. While for Rousseau, general law presupposes freedom,
because it is a ‘self-enacted’ law, for Oakeshott, it presupposes freedom simply
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because lex literally does not constrain. Rousseau asks who is the author of law,
when Oakeshott is concerned with what law actually does. Thus, the meaning of
civil freedom turns out to be the absence of constraint, that is, the familiar idea
of ‘negative’ liberty, though presented in quite a different way.
Another conclusion is that Oakeshott’s position may shed light on the con-
fused distinction between what are called ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty. Accord-
ing to Isaiah Berlin, ‘negative’ freedom refers to the absence of constraint, where-
as ‘positive’ freedom emphasizes self-determination and autonomy.47 One can
find some parallels between Oakeshott and Berlin. Absence of constraint is
implied in Oakeshott’s understanding of civil freedom; and ‘human freedom’ may
sound somewhat similar to the idea of human autonomy. But, according to
Oakeshott, the meaning of freedom as ‘human freedom’ is irrelevant to any
political considerations. It is the postulate of human conduct and therefore 
cannot be subject to any political or social project. Confusion crops up when the
idea of human being as a ‘free’ agent acquires the status of a different kind of 
freedom which can be used by political philosophy, so that ‘negative’ liberty and
‘positive’ liberty are presented as two political alternatives. But as a political 
theorist Oakeshott belongs unambiguously to the camp of what is identified as
‘negative’ liberty simply because for him ‘positive’ political liberty does not exist.
The view advocated by Oakeshott also provides us with an elegant answer to
the dilemma in which every theorist of ‘negative’ freedom is likely to find him-
self. For one is constrained to do something that he desires or may desire to do.
One can argue, therefore, that freedom can be augmented not only by reducing
limitations, but also by changing one’s desires. Any attempt to present a radical
solution to this problem leads to two opposite extremes.
There is a ‘materialistic’ view, advocated by Hillel Steiner, who defines free-
dom as ‘the personal possession of physical objects’ so that any increase in the
number of physical objects controlled by one agent constitutes an increase of his
freedom and a decrease of freedom of other agents to whom the control of these
objects is consequently denied.48 This approach, however, is opposed to our basic
intuitions. We are aware that there are meaningful preferences according to
which freedom in some aspects is more valuable than freedom in others. This is
the position of Charles Taylor. But from this assumption Taylor makes a logi-
cally unnecessary move towards the view that it is possible to evaluate different
preferences. And thereby he rejects the liberal idea of ‘negative’ freedom.49
Oakeshott’s view offers the way out of this dilemma. On the one hand, the 
element of ‘reflectivity’ in his view shows that a purely materialistic utilitarian
view of freedom is absurd, and that freedom is lacking only when people recog-
nize themselves as unfree. On the other hand, the element of contingency does
not let this view collapse into the advocacy of freedom as ‘recognized necessity’
or like attempts to misuse freedom and eliminate the aspect of genuine choice
and indeterminacy from human conduct.
Thus, by presenting this view, Oakeshott employs a vocabulary and arguments
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different from familiar common-sense utilitarian arguments. Yet his view is, in
effect, a defence of the modern western liberal view of freedom, though from a
different standpoint.
This liberalism should not be confused with political radicalism of the sort,
advocated by Richard Flathman who argues that:
. . . if known politically organized associations . . . are predominantly teleocracies, then
human beings who treasure individuality, plurality, and freedom will (perhaps informed
and emboldened by awareness of the contrasting ideal offered by Oakeshott) stand in a
vigilant, defensive, even antagonistic posture towards their laws and other institutions and
institutionalisms.50
This is not, however, Oakeshott’s intention. His idea of freedom is indeed a 
liberal idea. But, according to Oakeshott, freedom has been actually achieved in
modern liberal countries to a great extent. Thus, the idea of civil association
should not be understood as an ideal of the perfectly free regime, but as the 
principle implied in many, though not all, institutions of modern liberal societies.
For Oakeshott, freedom is not an ideal, but an actual characteristic of western
liberal society, in so far as it is understood as a civil association. As he wrote:
. . . the freedom which we enjoy is nothing more than arrangements, procedures of a
certain kind: the freedom of an Englishman is not something exemplified in the procedure
of habeas corpus, it is, at that point, the availability of that procedure. And the freedom
which we wish to enjoy is not an ‘ideal’ which we premeditate independently of our
political experience, it is what is already intimated in that experience.51
From what we have seen, this phrase should not be regarded as a conservative
Burkean version of ‘positive’ freedom. This simply means that to know civil 
tradition is to know how people understand themselves, and what their values,
habits and desires are. Only by learning this can we know whether their laws are
understood as substantive or purposeless, and therefore know whether civil free-
dom exists or not in a given society.
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